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Abstract
Should legal rules be used to redistribute income? Or should income taxation be the
exclusive means for reducing income inequality? This article reviews the legal scholarship on this question. First, it traces how the most widely-cited argument in favor
of using taxes exclusively—Kaplow & Shavell’s (1994) “double-distortion” argument—
evolved from previous debates about whether legal rules could even be redistributive
and whether law and economics should be concerned exclusively with eÿciency or with
distribution as well. Next, it surveys the responses to the double-distortion argument.
These responses appear to have had only limited success in challenging the sturdy reputation of the double-distortion argument. Finally, it concludes by highlighting new
directions in a debate revived by increasing economic inequality.
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Introduction

Should legal rules be used to address income inequality? Or should the income tax system
be the exclusive means to redistribute income? This question has existed in some form for
a very long time. Within legal scholarship it has been around at least since the rise of
the law-and-economics movement in the 1970s and 80s. The dust had largely settled by the
publication of Kaplow and Shavell’s (1994) “Why the Legal System Is Less Eÿcient than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income,” though the debate has never completely disappeared.
Now, with income inequality on the rise, and a cause of public concern, the debate shows
every sign of returning.
The purpose of this article is to review the debate on the law and economics of redistribution. It does so in three parts. Section 3 traces the debate’s origins in legal scholarship
up to its culmination in the seminal—and, for many, debate-concluding—article by Kaplow
and Shavell (1994). Kaplow and Shavell crafted a clear and elegant argument—dubbed the
“double-distortion” argument—demonstrating why the income tax should be the exclusive
means to redistribute income. Section 4 surveys the responses to Kaplow and Shavell’s
double-distortion argument. These responses appear to have had only limited success in
challenging the sturdy reputation of the double-distortion argument. Finally, Section 5 concludes by highlighting some unanswered questions and pointing to some new directions in
the revived debate. I believe the double-distortion argument is open to challenge—although
this still remains to be decisively demonstrated.
The argument that legal rules should not be used for distributive objectives is primarily
associated with law-and-economics scholarship. But at least three reasons foreclose any
attempt to dismiss this position based on this association alone. First, the argument is also
deeply ingrained within political liberal thought. The position is quite explicitly found in
the work of John Rawls (1999, 254), as well as many other political liberals (e.g., Alstott,
1999). The position cannot therefore simply be dismissed as a “pro-market” conservative
argument. Law-and-economics scholars may have devised the most sophisticated argument
for using taxes exclusively to redistribute income, but it is not a debate between liberals and
conservatives.
Second, it is also easy to misinterpret the debate as one between law-and-economics and
other intellectual disciplines. Yet, as this review will show, this is an erroneous characterization. The debate is better understood as one taking place within law and economics.
Some of the better arguments in favor of considering equity in legal rules come from those
trained in economics or who are self-identifed members, and even founders, of the economic
analysis of law. Even contributors to the debate who do not identify as law-and-economics
scholars use the same economic tools, methods, and theories as deployed by the opposing
side (Kelman, 1987, 151).
Third, it is likewise tempting to dismiss the double-distortion argument because of its
embrace of utilitarianism. Moral critiques of eÿciency and utilitarianism abound. And so
it is easy to dismiss an argument that tells us to uses taxes rather than legal rules merely
because it is more eÿcient to do so. Yet this objection, in my view, also fails. Many, if not
most, people who would consider the e˙ects of legal rules on rights, justice, or fairness would
also consider their e˙ects on individuals’ wealth or well-being. That is, a big part of why we
care about inequality and poverty is because of their consequences for well-being. So if an
1

argument says that using taxes exclusively will improve the well-being of the poor, it is one
we should pay attention to, regardless of the abstract normative justifcation.
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The Economics Background to the Debate in Legal
Scholarship

Before discussing the redistribution debate in legal scholarship, I will provide some background to the debate that begins outside legal scholarship, within economics.
The idea that income taxes should be the exclusive means of redistributing economic
resources is deeply entrenched within academic economic thought. One of the bedrock
propositions in welfare economics is the so-called Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare
Economics.1 The First Fundamental Theorem states that a perfectly competitive economy
(so defned) will be Pareto eÿcient. That is, in a perfectly competitive economy, no one
can be made better o˙ without making someone worse o˙. There may be many—possibly
infnite—Pareto eÿcient allocations associated with di˙erent distributions of income. This
is where the Second Fundamental theorem comes in. The Second Fundamental theorem
says that any Pareto eÿcient allocation of resources—including those with more “desirable”
distributions of income—can be achieved with lump sum transfers.2
Thus, a government need not interfere with prices or markets to achieve a (distributionally) desirable outcome. This is quite an attractive scenario. It requires only two policy
instruments: promote competition and lump-sum taxes. As Hindriks and Myles (2013)
write, “If this approach could be applied in practice, then economic policy analysis would
reduce to the formulation of a set of rules that guarantee competition and the calculation
and redistribution of the lump-sum taxes. The subject matter of public economics, and economic policy, in general, would then be closed” (p. 424). It is this policy simplicity that also
undoubtedly underlies the attractiveness of tax-only position against the use of legal rules
to redistribute income. The case for that position, however, requires addressing separate
challenges, as we will soon see.
The problem is that using lump sum taxes and transfers for redistributive objectives is
impossible in practice. Di˙erentiated lump sum taxation, as in perfect competition generally,
requires perfect and complete information. In order for a tax to be lump sum, the person
on whom the tax is levied must not be able to change the amount of tax she pays by
changing her behavior (Hindriks and Myles, 2013, 428). Otherwise, the tax will “distort”
her incentives, and lead us away from a Pareto eÿcient allocation. By this defnition, most
tax instruments are emphatically not lump sum. Income taxes, commodity taxes, estate
taxes—the amount a person pays for any of these can be changed by altering behavior. Poll
taxes—a uniform amount levied on each person—come close to being lump sum, but even
in this case experience suggests that taxes can be avoided through behavior.3 In any case, if
1
Fennell and McAdams (2016, 1065 n. 42) and McCa˙ery (2005, 817 n. 21) also recognize the link
between the taxes-versus-legal-rules debate and the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics.
2
I use scare quotes because the standard of Pareto eÿciency has no way of ordering Pareto eÿcient
allocations, either in terms of distribution or by any other criterion. Making distributional judgments within
economics requires additional, and more controversial, assumptions.
3
The United Kingdom implemented a poll tax in the 1980s as a source for local revenue. As Hindriks and
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one wants to achieve a more equitable distribution through lump sum taxes, which include
transfer payments, they will not be uniform across individuals. Endowment taxation seems
to be the only way to achieve this objective, but endowment taxation requires knowing the
abilities of individuals—their endowment—something which is private information to those
individuals themselves. And individuals do not have the incentive to report information
about their abilities honestly, if it will be used to their disadvantage.4 Thus, imperfect and
incomplete information prevents the use of lump-sum taxation to achieve a more desirable
distribution of resources.

3

Taxation, Legal Rules, and Redistribution

The debate about legal rules and redistribution thus starts outside of legal scholarship. This
section explores the evolution of the debate within legal scholarship, from its origins to
the development of the “double-distortion” argument. It is important to distinguish three
separate claims in this debate: (1) should the economic analysis of legal rules consider only
their consequences for eÿciency, or for equity as well; (2) is it even possible for legal rules to
redistribute; and (3), if possible, is taxation superior to legal rules as a tool for redistribution?
If anything, the debate helped to clarify these distinct issues as it evolved.

3.1

The Origins of the Debate in Legal Scholarship

Within legal scholarship, the debate begins in the 1970s. The radix can arguably be designated as Bruce Ackerman’s (1971) “Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the
Poor.” Although he did not identify himself as a law-and-economics scholar, Ackerman’s
analysis is straightforwardly economic.
Ackerman demonstrated that under certain conditions housing code enforcement could
redistribute from rich to poor. In the simplest, initial version of his model, he assumes,
in addition to perfect competition,5 that housing supply is fxed. Specifcally, the next,
best available use of the landlord’s property is low enough to ensure that, even with the
costs of housing code enforcement, the landlord will not convert or abandon (or destroy) the
building.6
To reach his critical result, Ackerman adopts one more condition. He assumes the existence of a small class of Slumville residents who are not willing to pay for improved housing. For instance, suppose two types of families live in Slumvilles’s 100,000 residential units:
Myles (2013) explain, it failed because “taxpayers could avoid paying the tax by ensuring that their names
did not appear on any oÿcial registers. Usually this was achieved by moving house and not making any
oÿcial declaration of the new address. . . . This ‘disappearance’ is a change in behavior that reduces the tax
burden” (p. 428).
4
Despite the impracticality of endowment taxation, it has been the subject of a rich debate in the legal
literature about its normative justifcation, even as an “ideal” tax (see, e.g., Hasen, 2006; Stark, 2005;
Zelenak, 2006). The debate has centered around the illiberalism or not of taxing highly people who have the
potential to earn high incomes, but may prefer not to for, say, lifestyle reasons.
5
Specifcally, he assumes rational self-interest, no market power, perfect information, and housing of
uniform quality. In the initial version, he also assumes perfect mobility within the area where all poor
residents live (“Slumville”) and no entry or exit outside this area.
6
This does not necessarily mean that landlords are earning even relatively high profts (ibid., p. 1103).
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90,000 families who would be willing to pay for improvements and 10,000 families who would
not.7 In a competitive housing market, these 10,000 families essentially determine the price
for housing. And because they are not willing to pay for housing improvements, landlords
are unable to pass on the costs of code-enforced improvements to tenants. Thus, the 90,000
poor Slumville tenants, who do value the improvements, are better o˙ without any increase
in rent. Landlords, who now face higher costs because of housing code enforcement, are
worse o˙. The housing code is redistributive.
Ackerman’s article provoked a small debate about the eÿciency and distributive e˙ects of
housing regulation. Several critiques of Ackerman’s article appeared (Komesar, 1973; Rabin,
1983) as did several articles defending or extending Ackerman’s analysis (Markovits, 1976;
Kennedy, 1987). Notably, not all of those who disagreed with Ackerman’s analysis were opposed to his conclusions (Komesar, 1983, 613). Furthermore, all of the participants accepted
the basic framework of economic theory, including those who identifed with di˙erent schools
of legal thought (e.g., Kennedy, 1987). Finally, one can see emerging within this debate the
three distinct questions that were raised at the beginning of this section (i.e., 3.1).

3.2

Should Economic Analysis of Law Consider Equity as well as
Eÿciency?

As we saw in Section 2, the Pareto criterion is deeply embedded in economic thought. One
normative justifcation for Pareto eÿciency is that it rests on a principle of consent (Posner,
1979, 489–90). Since a Pareto improvement is one where at least one person is made better
o˙ and no one worse o˙, who can argue with that? In this sense, Pareto eÿciency is neutral:
distributive issues are irrelevant to the economic analysis of legal rules. Everyone benefts
from a bigger pie.
Yet, as legal scholars above all were quick to point out, few legal rules have such innocent
e˙ects. Typically, changes in legal rules have winners and losers. Recognizing this, scholars
advanced a new defnition of eÿciency: Kaldor-Hicks eÿciency.8 Under the Kaldor-Hicks
test, a legal rule change is eÿcient if the aggregate benefts exceed the aggregate costs. In
other words, if the winners could monetarily compensate the losers, the change is eÿcient.
Although distribution remains an issue under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, the fact that
winners could compensate losers suggests that everyone could still be made better o˙. Posner
(1979) developed an “ex-ante consent” theory to advance this view. For example, consider
two legal rules: strict liability, which favors pedestrians, and negligence, which favors automobile drivers. For the sake of discussion, also assume that strict liability is ineÿcient and
negligence is eÿcient. Now, it is clear which rule you’d prefer if you knew if you were a
driver or a pedestrian. But, from behind a veil of ignorance, not knowing which you would
be, your best bet is to choose the eÿcient rule—negligence—because this rule minimizes
ex-ante, expected costs. And, indeed, since many of us are sometimes drivers and sometimes
7

Not that these 10,000 families do not recognize that they would beneft from improved housing, as
Ackerman notes, just that their poverty makes them unwilling to allocate any more of their scare funds to
purchase it.
8
For a remarkably clear and rigorous introduction and critique to the concepts of Pareto eÿciency,
Kaldor-Hicks eÿciency, and wealth maximization, see Coleman (1979).
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pedestrians, we can say that winners and losers are (often? sometimes?) the same. Under
this argument, Pareto eÿciency’s “consent” attribute survives under Kaldor-Hicks eÿciency.
In response to the alleged neutrality of Kaldor-Hicks eÿciency, critics showed that it
could give arbitrary and indeterminate answers, especially when distributive issues—wealth
e˙ects—were included in the analysis (Kelman, 1987, 141–50). Suppose a factory has the
right to pollute, with the consequence that the pollution lowers home values in the neighboring community. Since this infuences the homeowners’ wealth, it also contracts their budget
constraints, which a˙ects their demand for goods, including their willingness to “purchase”
the factory’s entitlement to pollute. Given their lower wealth, they may not be willing to
pay the factory to stop polluting. Conversely, suppose we give the homeowners the property
entitlement to enjoin the factory from polluting. Without pollution, home values are higher,
wealth is higher, and the enjoyment of a pollution-free environment greater as well. In this
case, the amount the factory might have to pay the homeowners for the right to pollute may
be higher than what the homeowners were willing to pay to get the factory to stop polluting. If so, homeowners may prevent pollution in the case where they own the entitlement
but permit it when the factory has the entitlement. In this scenario, either allocation of
the entitlement is “eÿcient” and we cannot decide which one is superior on Kaldor-Hicks
grounds.
The eÿciency-only view could be attacked from other angles from within law and economics. Readers familiar with this literature will be aware of the so-called Coase Theorem. The Coase Theorem says that in a world of zero transaction costs, the allocation
of resources—eÿciency—is independent of initial legal entitlements. Less appreciated is
what Schwab (1989, 1195) dubs the “Distributive Corollary” to the Coase Theorem: “With
zero transaction costs, initial entitlements cannot be justifed on eÿciency grounds, and so
should be awarded on the basis of need or desert.” Stated slightly di˙erently, the distributive corollary says that although legal entitlements do not a˙ect eÿciency they will a˙ect
the distribution of resources,9 at least in bargaining environments or “thin” markets (where
bargaining over surplus takes place) (ibid., p. 1178–79).10
On this interpretation, the Coase Theorem threatens to upend the entire eÿciency edifce. With zero transaction costs, the choice of legal rules is irrelevant for eÿciency; only
distribution matters. This is, of course, the complete opposite of the argument that the
economic analysis of law should consider eÿciency only and ignore distribution. The rub,
of course, is that we do not live in a world of zero transaction costs. With positive transaction costs, we cannot be sure about the consequences of legal rules for either eÿciency or
distribution.
Yet, even with positive transaction costs, Calabresi (1991) argued that distributional
issues could not be ignored. Transaction costs, he argues, no less than existing technology,
defne what is maximally feasible in any society. “It follows that any given society is always
9
The corollary has obvious similarities with both older and newer critiques of both the tax-only view of
redistributive policy as well as law and economics more generally. In terms of the older, see Hale (1923,
1943). In terms of the newer, see Kennedy (1991, 1998). Schwab (1989, 1195–96), citing the distributive
corollary, concludes that is “wrong” to rely on the Coase Theorem in favor of any particular political position
or “ethical view on wealth distribution.”
10
See subsection 3.3 for a discussion of the importance of the di˙erence between contractual and noncontractual settings.
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or will immediately arrive at a Pareto optimal point given transaction costs” (ibid., p. 1212).
Hence, no moves from the status quo are possible without making someone worse o˙. We
are always on the Pareto frontier; distributional issues are inevitable.
Furthermore, Calabresi fnds Posner’s ex-ante consent theory unconvincing. First, we
typically do know something about winners and losers, and they are often not the same
group: “Once we are no longer ignorant, any number of di˙erences may cause us to believe
that losses or gains to some matter more than losses or gains to others” (ibid., p. 1223;
emphasis in original). Second, “no such [ex ante] social contract was ever made” (ibid., p.
1225) and, if there was, who is to say that Kaldor-Hicks would be the standard rather than,
say, Rawls’ maximin principle?11
The conclusion is that the e˙ort to turn principles of eÿciency—Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks—
into neutral standards for evaluating legal rules did not succeed. It is impossible to ignore
equity on these standards alone.

3.3

Can Legal Rules Redistribute?

To be clear then, legal rules are profoundly distributive. No one disputes this, as the embrace
of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and the Coase Theorem indicates. Yet some scholars argued
that there was an important exception. This exception is when we attempt to redistribute
between parties in a competitive market relationship. When parties are in market relationship, the cost of legal rules can be “passed on,” frustrating the redistributive intent of the
rule (Schwab, 1989, 1179) and (Polinsky, 1989, 123–24).12 This led Polinsky (1989, 122) to
conclude that “legal rules often cannot redistribute income in contractual disputes, whereas
legal rules always can redistribute income in disputes between strangers.”
For example, in an elegant analysis Hamada (1976) demonstrated that in a competitive
market with potentially defective products, liability rules (no liability, negligence, or strict
liability) make no di˙erence to either the allocation of resources (i.e., eÿciency) or to the
distribution of income. Whatever the rule, the damages caused by a potential defect are
either part of the implicit or explicit price of the good. In case of negligence, for instance,
the buyer will be responsible for damages (as long as the seller has taken reasonable precautions).13 This may make for a nominally low explicit price for the good, but the buyer
understands that the implicit price, which includes the potential cost of harm, is higher.
Conversely, under a strict-liability rule the seller is liability for product accidents. But since
11

Hypothetical social contract arguments generate di˙erent standards of judgment depending on how risk
averse we believe people are behind the veil of ignorance. Risk neutrality yields Kaldor-Hicks; maximal risk
aversion yields maximin.
12
The existence of a competitive market relationship is indeed important. Schwab (1989, 1179): “In
competitive markets, price equals cost and cost is the minimum possible cost; if the contract presumption
would increase costs, the parties will write around it (assuming low transaction costs), and cost and price
remain unchanged. But in markets where price can exceed cost, a favorable contract presumption may
increase one’s bargaining power. Even if the benefciary waives the presumption, he may receive a greater
share of the surplus for doing so.”
13
It is typically argued that either negligence or strict liability leads sellers to choose a reasonable or
eÿcient level of precaution. The existence of competitive markets encourages the same under a rule of
caveat emptor. Otherwise, a seller who takes an ineÿciently low level of precaution will have higher costs
than her competitors.
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the probability of accidents or their costs do not change with the liability rule, they will
simply become part of the (higher) explicit price of the good. Thus, in competitive markets,
liability rules make no di˙erence to the distribution of income.14
Richard Craswell (1991) responded to competitive markets objection in a remarkably
lucid analysis.15 Craswell says that whether legal rules can redistributive between parties in
a competitive market depends on two conditions. First, consumers must be heterogeneous
in their willingness to pay for the legal rule. Second, there must be a positive correlation
between those willing to pay for the beneft of the legal rule and those willing to pay for
the product or service itself. Under these conditions, legal rules can indeed be redistributive
even in competitive market conditions.16
Consider whether a court should read an implied warranty into every contract for a sale
of a product. Suppose also that all consumers would pay exactly the same amount for the
addition of a warranty. Craswell shows in this homogenous case that consumers can only
beneft from the addition of the warranty if their willingness to pay for it exceeds the cost of
its addition to sellers. Since the beneft of the warranty exceeds its cost, the net beneft is
positive. Conversely, if the beneft of the warranty does not exceed its cost, consumers su˙er.
Craswell concludes that “when consumers have identical preferences regarding a warranty
or other legal rule, consumers will beneft from the rule if, and only if, the rule is eÿcient
under a Kaldor-Hicks test” (ibid., p. 372).17 Since there is no confict between eÿciency
and equity in this homogeneous case, the question of whether legal rules can redistribute is
moot.
Compare this to the heterogeneous case. As a simplifying matter, suppose that the
marginal consumers—those on the margin between buying or not buying the product—
value the warranty by an amount equal to the cost of the warranty to the sellers. Marginal
consumers (as well as sellers) will therefore be indi˙erent to the addition of the warranty.
On the other hand, if infra-marginal consumers (those willing to pay more for the product)
also value the warranty highly, the addition of a warranty will make them strictly better o˙.
14

In response to this “bargaining around” argument, it is sometimes objected that the costs of legal rules
should be treated like the problem of tax incidence (see, e.g., Blumkin and Margalioth, 2005, 4–5). Who
pays for a tax (or cost of a legal rule) depends on the relative elasticities of supply and demand. Depending
on these elasticities either the buyer or the seller may primarily bear the burden of the tax (or cost of the
legal rule). Thus, there is no general rule that sellers will be able to “pass on” the cost of a tax or legal rule.
Yet as Craswell (1991) demonstrated, this analogy is mistaken. A tax merely increases the cost of a
product or service. In contrast, a legal rule increases the cost but also provides some beneft to the consumer
(e.g., a warranty), and therefore changes her willingness to pay for it. Thus one cannot treat the e˙ects of
legal rules like taxes. Put slightly formally, the addition of a tax changes only product price and therefore
quantity. These can be analyzed as moves along supply and demand curves. A legal rule, in contrast, often
a˙ects product quality. This induces shifts in supply and demand curves.
15
Kennedy (1981) explores a very similar economic analysis.
16
Craswell demonstrates that Ackerman (1971) is a special case of his argument (see Craswell, 1991,
380–83).
17
Another interesting implication is that “the signifcance of sellers’ ability to pass along their costs in such
a market is exactly the opposite of what most people suppose” (ibid., p. 372). For example, if consumers
value the warranty by less than its cost to sellers, sellers will be able to pass on less then 100 percent of that
cost. But since consumers do not value the warranty very highly, this is a loss to consumers. Conversely,
when consumers value the warranty more than it costs sellers, sellers will be able to pass on 100 percent of
the costs.
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Conversely, if the infra-marginal consumers value the addition of the warranty less than the
marginal consumers, consumers as a class are made worse o˙. It is therefore essential that
those that value the product the most (the infra-marginal consumers) also value the legal
rule the most.
The analysis gets more complicated when marginal consumers value the warranty more
or less than its cost to sellers. However, there are conditions when, if the marginal consumer
values the warranty less than its cost, consumers as a class will be better o˙ and sellers
worse o˙. In short, it is indeed possible for legal rules to redistribute in competitive markets.
“The important point,” as Craswell recognizes, “is that such a warranty might be regarded
as good . . . for consumers as a class even if it were ineÿcient under an overall Kaldor-Hicks
standard” (ibid., p. 380, emphasis in original).
In sum, legal rules can indeed be redistributive. And not just in disputes between
strangers, but within the competitive marketplace as well.

3.4

Is the Income Tax Superior to Legal Rules in Redistributing
Income?

Fierce resistance thus confronted legal scholars who thought the economic analysis of legal
rules should be concerned exclusively with eÿciency rather than equity. First, the choice of
standard for eÿciency, Kaldor-Hicks, could not e˙ectively allay concerns about distribution.
Second, the distributive e˙ects of legal rules could not be ignored—even in the case of
competitive markets where it was believed that producers could simply pass on the cost of
pro-consumer legal rules.
But if eÿciency-only scholars had to concede the frst two points, they began to concentrate on the third. That is, even if distribution was a normatively valid concern and even
if legal rules has pervasive distributive consequences, legal rules are less e˙ective in doing
so than through income taxes. Note also that prevailing on this point would be an answer
to the frst question as well. If the tax-and-transfer system alone should address society’s
distributive concerns, then the evaluation of legal rules could focus on eÿciency and ignore
equity.
There are various supporting arguments for this claim, but the literature has boiled
them down to three. The frst can be called the “imprecision” or “haphazardness” argument (Polinsky, 1989, 124–27). Redistributive legal rules may favor tenants over landlords,
employees over employers, and consumers over business owners. But each of these groups
only imperfectly overlaps with rich and poor, as defned by income. Some consumers, after
all, are quite rich. Redistribution through legal rules therefore depends on “crude averages”
(Cooter and Ulen, 2016, 8). Income taxation, on the other hand, can be precisely tailored
to target the problem we wish to solve: income inequality.
A second counter argument can be labeled the “bargaining around” argument (Polinsky,
1989, 122–23). We have seen this argument before in the previous section (3.3). The important point here is that although legal rules can redistribute, they are not guaranteed to
do so e˙ectively and may, in certain instances, pass on a signifcant amount of the costs to
consumers. Broad-based income taxation avoids these kinds of highly-specifc price e˙ects,
and is therefore a more e˙ective redistributive tool (Cooter and Ulen, 2016, 8).

8

3.5

The Double-Distortion Argument

There is also a third counter argument, considered by most to be the strongest argument for
why the income tax is more eÿcient than legal rules in redistributing income. This is the
“double distortion” argument by Kaplow and Shavell (1994).18 Kaplow and Shavell are quite
conscious of the challenge that information economics presents to the Second Fundamental
Theorem of welfare economics. They write:
[the debate between using legal rules and taxes] would be moot if the income tax
system—understood here to include possible transfer payments to the poor—
could be used freely to achieve any desired distribution of income. But income
taxes and transfer payments distort incentives to work, limiting the degree to
which it is socially desirable to employ the income tax system to redistribute
income. (P. 667.)
They nevertheless are also adamantly clear in claiming, as manifested in their article’s title,
that “redistribution through legal rules o˙ers no advantage over redistribution through the
income tax system and typically is less eÿcient” (ibid.).
This conclusion follows from the “double distortion” caused by legal rules. Taxation
causes a single distortion to labor-supply incentives, alternatively called the labor-leisure
decision.19 Taxation reduces the rewards from work, and so individuals reduce their supply
of labor to the market and/or allocate less time to paid activities and more time to leisure,
causing a loss in wealth and output. In contrast, a redistributive legal rule not only distorts
labor supply, but it “also creates ineÿciencies in the activities regulated by the legal rules.”
Since it is better to have a single, rather than a double, distortion, switching to an eÿcient,
non-redistributive legal rule will create a Pareto improvement. Through a modifcation of
the tax schedule, the additional output can in fact be used to make the poor better o˙ than
they would be under the redistributive legal rule.
Let’s summarize their example in order to make this claim more concrete. Suppose we
have a tax regime where high-income individuals are taxed at a rate of 30 percent. Also
suppose that we want to increase redistribution by using a legal rule that benefts the poor
at the expense of the rich. In their main example, such a legal rule is a damages rule in tort
that depends on the relative wealth of the injurer and victim: the damages an injurer pays
increases with her income (relative to, say, average income). Assume this legal rule transfers
an additional 1 percent of income from high earners to low earners. High-income individuals
therefore pay 30 percent of each additional dollar to the tax system and 1 percent to the
legal system.
Compare this regime to another regime with an eÿcient, non-redistributive legal rule.
Their choice is strict liability, where an injurer, rich or poor, must pay for all harm caused.20
18

An early version of the argument is found in Shavell (1981). The double-distortion argument has been
defended in Kaplow and Shavell (2000b) and elaborated in Kaplow (1996). Kaplow and Shavell frequently
cite in support of their argument Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979).
19
Of course, there may be other distortions and costs as well, such as administrative burdens. But since
a legal system obviously has administrative costs as well, these are typically ignored in the analysis of the
economics of taxation.
20
This rule is eÿcient because it internalizes an externality: the social costs caused by harm-inducing
activities are now made private when individuals must pay for those harms.
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Suppose also that in this second regime we raise the tax rate for high earners to 31 percent.
Which regime should we choose? First, in terms of labor-supply incentives the regimes
are identical. Thirty-one percent of a high-earner’s income goes to the tax authorities in the
second case, and is split between the tax and legal systems in the frst case. But what a
high earner gets to keep at the end of the day is the same. So the choice of regimes makes
no di˙erence for labor supply.
However, activities regulated by the legal rule will be di˙erent. With the income dependent damages rule, the rich spend too many resources on precaution and the poor too little,
which causes more accidents. Resources are therefore saved with the eÿcient legal rule and
these savings can be used to improve everyone’s welfare (making it a Pareto improvement).21
As Kaplow and Shavell explain, “[B]ecause redistribution is accomplished in the presence of
an eÿcient legal rule, resources would, by defnition, be saved. With this savings, all individuals could be made better o˙ (for example, by reducing taxes and increasing payments
to the poor)” (idid., 668).
To conclude this section, legal rules may very well be redistributive. They can, in fact, improve the welfare and income of the poor. But there are powerful arguments that everyone—
including the poor—could be made better o˙ by redistributing exclusively through the tax
system. This, in turn, becomes an argument for why the economic analysis of legal rules
should be concerned solely with eÿciency.

4

Critiques of the Double-Distortion Argument

Several critiques have been made of the double-distortion argument. None seem to have
been successful in fully dismantling the claim. This section will try to understand why.

4.1

Behavioral Economics

Jolls (1998) applies behavioral economics to the issue of redistributive legal rules. She makes
two arguments for why legal rules might distort work incentives less than taxes. First,
people treat certain events (like taxes, which alongside death is the only thing certain in
life) di˙erently than uncertain events (like accidents). “People will tend to underestimate
the probability that they will be hit with liability under a redistributive legal rule; therefore,
their perceived cost of the rule will be lower” (ibid., p. 1662). For example, suppose a
high-income person faces a tax bill of $10,000. Suppose she also faces a .02 probability of
causing an accident that incurs a tort liability of $500,000. In expected terms, these two
costs are the same (.02 x $500,000 = $10,000). Because the accident is uncertain however,
her perceived tort liability is lower than her tax liability. Accordingly, the tort damages will
distort her work incentives less than the taxes. This may make the damages rule in tort a
better tool for redistribution than taxes.
21

Kaplow and Shavell approach the argument a slightly di˙erent way in their formal presentation. In
place of the ineÿcient, redistributive legal rule, they propose a distribution-neutral adjustment to the tax
schedule with the eÿcient rule. Because of the ineÿciency in the legal rule, achieving a distributionallyneutral change requires higher taxes on the rich and lower transfers to the poor to account for the ineÿcient
levels of accidents and precautionary costs. This generates a budget surplus, which can be rebated in the
form of lower taxes and higher transfers and generates the Pareto improvement.
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The second reason Jolls gives for why legal rules will distort labor incentives less than
taxes is that the costs of the two methods will be attributed to two di˙erent “mental accounts.” “The idea behind ‘mental accounting’ is that people do not always view a dollar
spent in the same way; it may matter very much from which ‘account’ the dollar is coming”
(ibid., p. 1669).22 For instance, people probably see the cost of taxes as a direct charge
against their income. In contrast, the cost of redistributive legal rules may be viewed as
expenditures out of income. This is because an income-dependent damages rule is caused
not just by a person’s higher income (as it would be with taxes), but is also a product of the
accident as well. Tax liability has a sole cause (income) while higher damages have a dual
cause (income and accident). Jolls also argues that expenditures out of income will distort
work incentive less than direct charges out of income. If such is the case, there may be an
eÿciency advantage to using legal rules rather than taxes to redistribute income.
However, Jolls attaches some signifcant caveats to her claims. She applies her analysis to
individuals, rather than frms, which may in important cases overestimate the risk of certain
harms (ibid., p. 1663). She focuses only on tort law, where “uncertainty” is paradigmatic;
her analysis may not apply to other areas of law, such as contract (ibid., p. 1657–58). She
acknowledges that the e˙ects of insurance have unclear consequences for her claims (ibid.,
p. 1666). Her argument that people will attribute taxes and tort damages to di˙erent
accounts is much more speculative than her claim about the underestimation of negative
events.23 Finally, Jolls also asks whether it is fair to use persons’ cognitive biases to “disguise”
taxation: “is it proper for government to make of this error in citizens’ perception?” (ibid.,
pp. 1675–76, 1677). All of these considerations cast doubt on the extent to which behavioral
economics favors legal rules over taxes to redistribute income.

4.2

Heterogeneity

Sanchirico (2000b) presents perhaps the most sophisticated critique to-date of the doubledistortion argument. Sanchirico contends that “even in the presence of an optimally redistributive tax, any concern for ‘equity’ dictates that legal rules should deviate from eÿcient
standards in a manner that redistributes toward the less well-o˙” (ibid., p. 797). According
22

Jolls (1998, 1669–70) gives the following illustration of mental accounting. Suppose you are going to
watch a movie where the ticket price is $10 and that you also lose $10 along the way. Would you still pay
$10 to see the movie? Compare this with a slightly di˙erent scenario. Suppose you purchase your movie
ticket ahead of time and later, just before entering the theater, you realize you have lost your ticket. Would
you purchase another $10 ticket? Under standard economic theory, these situations are identical. It is either
worth purchasing the ticket or it is not, regardless of whether you lost $10 cash or a $10 movie ticket (or
anything else worth $10). However, actual responses to the two scenarios di˙er dramatically. “Eighty-eight
percent of respondents in Case 1 would still pay $10 for a ticket, but only forty-six percent of respondents
in Case 2 would buy a new ticket” (ibid., p. 1669). The idea of mental accounting explains these di˙erent
responses. In the frst case, the lost money and the movie ticket are charged to “separate accounts.” In the
second case, both costs are charged to the same, “entertainment” account, which is perhaps more than what
the individual wants to spend on that category.
23
“Much more would be necessary, of course, before reaching any sort of fnal conclusion about the e˙ects of
redistributive legal rules and taxes from a mental accounting perspective. The empirical evidence discussed
above (and the other empirical evidence of which I am aware on the topic of mental accounting) involves
contexts that are quite di˙erent from the one addressed in this Essay, and it may be that mental accounting
is a highly context-specifc phenomenon” (ibid., p. 1672).
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to Sanchirico, the missing element in Kaplow and Shavell (1994) is suÿcient heterogeneity in
individuals’ characteristics.24 For example, while Kaplow and Shavell assume in their formal
model that persons are di˙erent in their ability to earn income, they also assume that people
are identical (i.e., homogeneous) in, for example, their ability in taking precautions against
accidents. Because of this identity, the income-dependent damages rule a˙ects everyone similarly, leading only to a loss of eÿciency. However, as Sanchirico argues, if individuals also
di˙ered in their precaution-taking abilities, an income-dependent damages rule will actually
increase welfare.
Kaplow and Shavell (2000b) quickly responded to the heterogeneity critique. Kaplow
and Shavell answered, “we believe Sanchirico’s claim that our basic argument is subject to
certain qualifcations is correct but does not go to the heart of whether legal rules should be
systematically adjusted to favor the poor and disfavor the rich in order to further distributive
objectives” (ibid., p. 828). Suppose that rich yacht owners are prone to accidents (“klutzy”)
and that their victims are poor fshing boat owners. Should damages be raised to redistribute
from the rich yacht owners to poor fsherman? Kaplow and Shavell say, “No.” In fact, the
legal rule should be adjusted to favor rich yacht owners and disfavor poor fsherman because
a pro-defendant adjustment helps klutzier yacht owners, who are less well-o˙ than their rich,
non-klutzy peers. What about the poor? Kaplow and Shavell contend that an adjustment
to the income tax could compensate fshing boat owners for lower damage payments. Thus,
redistribution between rich and poor is kept the same while helping helping klutzes within the
group of rich yacht owners. The bottomline: Sanchirico is technically correct, but “optimal
adjustments to legal rules have no general, a priori relationship to the notion that legal rules
should favor the poor in order to further redistributive objectives” (ibid., p. 832). According
to Kaplow and Shavell, this is not redistribution in the conventional sense.
Sanchirico (2000a) mounted a rejoinder. He observed that neither were Kaplow and
Shavell targeting income per se, but rather, like Sanchirico, were attempting to reduce
inequality in overall well-being. In terms of Kaplow and Shavell’s example (critiquing
Sanchirico), “if the rich yacht owners are better-o˙ overall [than poor fsherman], then
Kaplow and Shavell have it backwards. . . . [T]he equity adjustment to the tort system
should favor the poor fshing-boat owners, and not the rich yacht owners” (ibid., p. 1035–
36). Nevertheless, Sanchirico’s (2000a; 2000b) own models show that whether legal rules
should favor the rich or the poor depends on the covariance between income-earning ability and care-taking ability. It therefore remains unclear whether legal rules should favor or
disfavor the rich.25

4.3

Moral and Philosophical Objections

As economists, Kaplow and Shavell are of course committed to eÿciency and the other
normative tools of welfare economics—all of which fall within the gambit of utilitarianism.
One strategy of critique therefore has been to challenge the moral underpinnings of the
double-distortion argument. One critique targets income (or wealth) and its ability (or
inability) to serve as a “stand in”—a substitute or functional equivalent—for other values,
24
25

Avraham, Fortus and Logue (2003) also make the heterogeneity critique.
Gamage (2014, 14) draws a similar conclusion.
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norms, or goods. Another objection attacks more broadly the the moral adequacy of concepts
such as utility, welfare maximization, and so forth.
One line of criticism takes Kaplow and Shavell to task for focusing on income redistribution. Such a focus will ignore characteristics other than income that may be desirable
bases for redistribution.26 When other bases of redistribution exist, legal rules may be better
equipped than the tax-and-transfer system to address them. Blumkin and Margalioth (2005)
use the example of race discrimination. Suppose that because of discrimination (rather than
ability) members of a racially-disfavored group earn less income than the racially-favored
group. In principle, the income tax could be used to grant a refundable tax credit to members of the racially-disfavored group, and calculated to full eliminate race-based earnings
di˙erences. Yet, “[t]ransfers based on ethnic origin are not common in practice because of
the desire to eliminate the ability of discriminators to purchase their right to discriminate—
which seems intrinsically immoral—and for symbolic reasons” (ibid., p. 16). Income is
inadequate to address all forms of inequity.
Kaplow and Shavell have two responses to such criticisms. First, as we have already seen
(e.g., Kaplow and Shavell, 2000b, 827–32), redistributing goods or values other than income
falls outside the concern of their double-distortion argument. For Kaplow and Shavell, using
legal rules “to redistribute” means “to redistribute income.”27 Furthermore, they contend, a
legal-rule adjustment made on some non-income basis is “qualitatively di˙erent from the adjustments that we suspect most legal academics have in mind when they talk about adjusting
legal rules to favor the poor” (ibid., p. 829–30).28 Second, rules that address other forms of
inequality—as anti-discrimination legislation—may actually be eÿcient and therefore pose
no eÿciency-equity tradeo˙.29
Another line of criticism challenges the entire apparatus of Kaplow and Shavell’s normative framework. Whether maximizing wealth or income, welfare or utility, their fundamentally utilitarian approach is said to ignore other fundamental norms and values—justice,
rights, or fairness, for example.30 In an extensive series of books and articles, Kaplow and
26

See, for example, Blumkin and Margalioth (2005, 3); “people may have preferences for the means of
redistribution which may have intrinsic value for them”; Lewinsohn-Zamir (2006, 331): “in lieu of the
simplistic economic premise of source-independence, I submit that the beneft people derive from resources
depends on complex factors, including the acts that generate the resources and the source from which
they are received. . . . The same quantity of goods may be more or less valuable depending on the mode
of its production”; and Liscow (2014, 2502): one “reason for considering equity in legal rules is the goal
of maximizing social welfare in ways the tax-and-transfer system is unable or poorly equipped to do—in
particular, when characteristics other than income are desirable bases of redistribution.”
27
Liscow (2014, 2502) recognizes this: “[Kaplow and Shavell] are not ‘wrong’ in not considering non-income
factors; they are just asking a di˙erent question. The Kaplow-Shavell argument is a non sequitur in the
context of redistribution for non-income reasons.”
28
Lewinsohn-Zamir (2006) makes a more subtle point about the di˙erence between income and other
“goods.” Using the example of the warranty of habitability, she argues that income is no substitute for
a “rat-infested, leaking and broken-down apartment.” Such a dwelling “cannot grant the basic security,
comfort and means that are essential for advancing self-respect and autonomous action, acquiring knowledge,
pursuing long-term goals, or developing deep and meaningful social relationships with other people” (ibid.,
pp. 350–51).
29
For a discussion of the eÿciency of disparate impact rules, see, e.g., Ayres (2007).
30
Taking a slightly di˙erent line of attack, Lewinsohn-Zamir (2006) accepts a consequential framework,
like Kaplow and Shavell, but endorses instead an “objective” measure of well-being. Utility maximization,
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Shavell (1999; 2000a; 2001b; 2001a; 2003; 2009) have responded to such criticisms. Their
position is that when evaluating legal policies, exclusive weight should be put on their e˙ects
on individuals well-being, with no independent 31 weight accorded to notions of justice or
fairness. However, discussing such fundamental issues threatens to take us away from our
present topic. What can be said is that the debate between consequentialist and deontological approaches to ethics is unlikely to end soon.32

4.4

Political Action Costs

A common, colloquial reaction to the double-distortion thesis is that it fails to recognize the
political diÿculties of enacting a robust, redistributive tax regime, let a lone an optimal or
ideal one. Fennell and McAdams (2016) explore this intuition on the scholarly level.
Fennell and McAdams claim that the double-distortion argument’s prescriptive advice
rests on a “distributive-invariance” hypothesis.33 This hypothesis states that the overall level
of redistribution in society is fxed—unique—such that if a court, for example, were to adopt
a redistributive legal rule, the legislature (refecting the current political equilibrium) would
o˙set the distributive change through a tax adjustment.34 Endorsing the double-distortion
argument’s policy prescription “requires accepting the strong assumption that the distributive pattern in a society will be invariant to the political form of redistribution” (ibid., p.
1069–70). “If the amount of redistribution is fxed, then it is obvious that one should want
to accomplish that redistribution in the most eÿcient way” (ibid., p. 1070). Conversely, if
redistribution is not fxed and signifcant political costs prevent the introduction of a superior tax-and-transfer scheme, implementing redistribution through legal rules can increase
welfare.
Fennell and McAdams convincingly undermine the the distributive-invariance hypothesis. For example, it is diÿcult to precisely and completely o˙set distributive legal rules,
primarily for a reason often given against legal redistribution: it is haphazard. Also, legislative inertia—generated by institutional factors, such as veto points or federalism—prevents
legislatures from responding to legal redistributions. Other reasons against distributive invariance are framing, salience, and other cognitive biases. For instance, prospect theory
suggests that, since people weigh losses more heavily than gains, individuals will resist taxes,
which highlight the “taking away” of something already possessed more than certain kinds
she says, assumes that people’s well-being consists solely of satisfying their actual preferences, whatever
those may be.” The problem with this is that “[f]ulfllment of people’s actual preferences might result in a
reduction in their welfare, if their desires are based on misinformation, mistakes, or lack of self-respect and
self-esteem” (ibid., p. 330). However, Kaplow and Shavell (2001b, 984, 1330–34) already appear to endorse
an “objective” or at least “ideal” measure of welfare or well-being.
31
Kaplow and Shavell (2001b, 968) distinguish this broader standard of evaluating legal rules from eÿciency
or wealth maximization. Furthermore, their idea of well-being is broad enough to encompass several notions
of fairness. Moreover, they still adhere to their double-distortion argument which says that, in the case of
income redistribution, legal rules should be chosen on the basis of eÿciency or wealth maximization.
32
For some of the responses to Kaplow and Shavell’s approach to fairness versus welfare, see, e.g., Dor˙
(2001); Craswell (2003); Kornhauser (2003); Waldron (2003); Markovits (2004).
33
Markovits (2004) also recognizes and criticizes the distributive-invariance hypothesis.
34
Fennell and McAdams explicitly acknowledge that they do not attribute to Kaplow and Shavell “one
single, clearly stated proposition but rather a mostly unacknowledged premise revealed in scattered remarks”
(ibid., p. 1072).
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of redistributive legal rules. Finally, people may assess the “fairness” of taxes and legal rules
di˙erently.
However, while Fennell and McAdams’s critique of the distributive-invariance hypothesis
is convincing, it is not clear how much the double-distortion argument actually depends on
it. The real issue seems to be whether the political action costs of redistributing through
legal rules is greater or lesser than taxation. This is implied from their discussion of distributive variance, which they claim invalidates the double-distortion argument. Suppose
two di˙erent distributions of income are possible, one associated with a redistributive legal
rule (Outcome R) and the other with the “closest politically achievable all-tax alternative”
(Outcome T )(ibid., p. 1071). Using a social welfare function to measure distributive gains,
then on “some imaginable social welfare function . . . the distributive gains from Outcome
R relative to Outcome T would outweigh the eÿciency advantages of Outcome T relative
to Outcome R.” But according to the double-distortion argument, there always exists a
tax-alternative, call it Outcome T 0 , that achieves higher social welfare than one using redistributive legal rules under any social welfare function: T 0 > R.35 Thus, Fennell and
McAdams’s result (T 0 > R > T ) can only be true if something—political action or some
other costs—prevents Outcome T from being as large as Outcome T 0 and these costs are
greater than for achieving Outcome R. Thus, something more than distributive variance is
needed to undermine the double-distortion argument.
Fennell and McAdams give several examples of why legal rules might have lower political
action costs than taxation. But the reasons given seem just as likely to apply in reverse—
as many of their own examples indicate.36 Furthermore, the same characteristics (framing,
salience, cognitive biases, or fairness) given for the superiority of legal rules also tend to
weaken their redistributive potency. Finally, there are few, if any, institutional di˙erences
between taxes and redistributive legal rules. Fennell and McAdams frequently invoke the
scenario of a legislature responding to a court-adopted rule. But courts (relative to legislatures) have no exclusive domain over redistributive legal rules and it is not clear why courts
would be more receptive to redistributive demands than legislatures. Thus, there are no
strong reasons why the political action costs of legal rules should be systematically lower
than taxation.
Also, the argument against distributive invariance does nothing to challenge the basic
logic of the double-distortion thesis itself. As Fennell and McAdams frequently acknowledge,
they distinguish Kaplow and Shavell’s formal claim from a prescriptive claim. Their formal
claim is the subject of this article: any level of redistribution can be achieved more eÿciently
through taxes than through legal rules. The prescriptive claim is the policy advice that
follows from this: “ignore distributive considerations except when setting tax-and-transfer
35

This is because under Kaplow and Shavell’s analysis the tax reform is always a Pareto improvement,
which implies that welfare will increase for any social welfare function. The choice of welfare function will
only determine how the surplus for the tax reform will be distributed. If the social welfare function is
maximally sensitive to inequality (e.g., Rawlsian) it will all go to the poor. If it is less sensitive to inequality
some will also go to the rich.
36
The “salience” of di˙erent forms and methods of taxation can vary greatly (e.g., “paycheck withholding
or bundling with mortgage payments” (ibid., p. 1096)). Various forms of tax-and-transfer systems can
be perceived as more or less “fair” (e.g., cash versus in-kind transfers restricted for certain, “legitimate”
purposes (ibid., p. 1101–02)). Some forms of tax redistribution may be more politically sustainable than
others (e.g., universal versus means-tested programs (ibid., p. 1088–89)).
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policy” (ibid., p. 1058). Yet, as Fennell and McAdams state, they “do not take issue with”
Kaplow and Shavell’s formal claim (ibid., p. 1057). Thus, whatever the political action costs
of taxes or legal rules, this still leaves Kaplow and Shavell in a position to say that income
taxation is a more eÿcient tool for redistribution than legal rules.

4.5

Tax Distortions

Another criticism of the double-distortion argument explores its implications within the
domain of tax policy itself. When raising tax revenue, and even when implementing a labor
income tax, policymakers have a variety of options to choose from: consumption taxes (which
themselves can include valud-added taxes, sales taxes, or excise taxes), wealth taxes, or
income taxes (which could be levied on labor income, capital income, or both). One version
of the double-distortion argument says that only labor income taxes should be used.37 For
example, suppose we want to tax yachts, which are purchased only by rich people, as a way
to reduce inequality. The yacht tax distorts the labor-leisure (or labor supply) decision of
the rich because it reduces the purchasing power of income, making work less attractive
and leisure more so. But it also distorts the consumption decisions of the rich, causing
them to purchase fewer yachts and more of other goods—this creates a second, or double,
distortion. Accordingly, just like the previous double-distortion argument, the luxury tax
can be replaced with a new, distribution-neutral income tax, and everyone made better o˙.
Not surprisingly, legal scholars have contested this application of the double-distortion argument as well. One line follows closely Sanchirico’s heterogeneity critique.38 Gamage (2014,
2015) explores another dimension: di˙erences between various kinds of tax ineÿciencies (or
“distortions”). When analyzing income taxes, most economists focus on a single distortion:
the trade-o˙ between labor and leisure. But as Gamage points out, the labor-leisure distortion is hardly the only distortion caused by income taxation. In fact, more important is what
Gamage calls “tax gaming”—tax avoidance or tax evasion. Tax gaming is ineÿcient because
it wastes resources on avoiding or evading taxes that could be allocated to more productive
uses. Indeed, especially for “high-income taxpayers, for whom distributional considerations
are particularly relevant” tax gaming is of primary, and the labor-leisure distortion only of
secondary, importance (Gamage, 2014, 5).
Tax gaming is important for the choice of tax instruments. Tax gaming distortions are
“quite idiosyncratic and contingent” (ibid., p. 4). Indeed, Gamage argues that “taxpayers’
incentives to engage in tax gaming . . . are a direct function of only the tax rates of the labor
income tax. . . . [E]xcise tax rates should have only secondary e˙ects on incentives to engage
in [tax gaming]” (ibid., pp. 8–9). Therefore, it may indeed be optimal to impose the yacht
tax as in the previous example. The luxury tax may distort labor-supply and consumption
decisions, but it can also induce savings by lowering the income tax and the tax gaming
associated with it. This is underscored by Gamage’s focus on the “marginal cost of public
funds.” Since the economic costs of a tax instrument increases exponentionally in the tax
37
Specifcally, di˙erential commodity taxation is ineÿcient in the presence of an optimal income tax, and
uniform commodity taxation is useless. This result was frst demonstrated in a famous paper by Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1976). On similar assumptions, Kaplow (2006) demonstrated that this result holds under any
income tax schedule, not just the optimal one.
38
See, e.g., Saez (2002), Sanchirico (2010), Sanchirico (2011).
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rate, using many tax instruments at relatively moderate rates will be better than one, high
rate on income (ibid., pp. 10–11, 20). This is called the “tax-smoothing” principle (Gamage,
2015, 358).
One response to Gamage is to simply reform the income tax: remove the loopholes,
di˙erential rates, and other “idiosyncratic and contingent” factors that make tax gaming
possible. This would improve eÿciency and reduce the need to use multiple tax instruments, which Gamage acknowledges can also increase administrative and enforcement costs.
Gamage (2014, 366) replies that “tax lawyers, accountants, and fnanciers . . . can be expected
to devise numerous tax gaming responses for exploiting any conceivable real world form of
taxation.” But surely the extent of gaming can be made to vary and perhaps reduced substantially, if not entirely. If not, we could ask whether, if tax gaming is such an inevitability,
why any tax instrument is inherently less susceptible to it than another.
It is also not clear how far Gamage’s analysis extends beyond the tax scenario. There is
a discussion extending his argument to the use of non-tax legal rules (ibid, pp. 72–84), but
certainly more research needs to be done in this area. Furthermore, since the kinds of taxes
Gamage discusses are not also meant to regulate other behaviors, legal rules will always have
additional distortions going beyond those of any tax. This may give little comfort to those
who would seek to use legal rules, other than various forms of tax instruments, as tools for
redistribution.

5

New Directions in the Debate

None of the criticisms of the double-distortion argument seem to have been able to dismantle
it. Where does that leave us? For some time, the debate has subsided, leaving Weisbach
(2003, 439) to declare: “The overwhelming majority of law and economics scholarship looks
solely to eÿciency to evaluate legal rules.” However, the return of high-levels of economic
inequality, both in fact and in public consciousness, suggests an opportunity to revisit the
debate.

5.1

The Return of Economic Inequality

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the issue of income inequality tended to fade as a matter
of public policy concern. To the extent that economists discussed rising inequality, they
spoke of “skill-biased technical change” (see Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004, 587–95). This is
the idea that income inequalities were being driven by technology, which was expanding jobs
in high-skill sectors and contracting them in low-skill ones. The obvious solution to this
problem was simply education.
The publication of Piketty and Saez (2003) signaled a shift in the scholarly consensus.
Using tax record data, Piketty and Saez were able to get a much clearer look into the top
of the income distribution—as precise as the top one percent of income earners (whence the
slogan). Their data series, covering most of the twentieth century, suggested di˙erent explanations for the rise of income inequality at the end of the century. “We argue that both the
downturn and the upturn of top wage shares seem too sudden to be accounted for by technical change alone” (ibid., p. 3). Instead, they suggest changes in labor market institutions,
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fscal policy, or more generally social norms about pay inequality. Their data also indicate
that the growth of income inequality is too concentrated at the top of the distribution to
be explained by skill-biased technical change: “Stories based on the supply and demand for
skills are not enough to explain the extreme top tail of the earnings distribution” (Alvaredo
et al., 2013, 3). Finally, the publication of Piketty’s (2014) Capital in the Twenty-First
Century further cemented the changes taking place in public (and public-policy) discourse
about the rise of income inequality.
Unsurprisingly, the change in public discourse surrounding income inequality has began
to infuence legal scholarship (e.g., Hsu, 2014; Kleinbard, 2017; Kwak, 2015) and, inevitably,
has revived the debate around the double-distortion argument (e.g., Dimick, 2016; Fennell
and McAdams, 2016; Liscow, 2014).

5.2

Areas for Further Research

In this subsection, I will layout my own views on the double-distortion argument and why I
believe it comes up short. It also lays out a research agenda for my own future work, and
one that I hope others will pursue as well.
The double-distortion argument rests on the assumption that redistributive legal rules
will distort work incentives and the activities regulated by the legal rules. But why should
this be so? In fact, it is easy to think of examples where, even if the legal rules distorts work
incentives, the second—or double—distortion o˙sets rather than compounds the frst.
Consider the following example of the minimum wage. Assume that there are just two
households. One household is rich and owns a frm where labor is the only input; the other
household is poor and supplies labor to the frm. It is often theorized that the cost of the
minimum wage is at least partially o˙set by increases in labor productivity or reductions in
labor costs (other than wages). For example, an increase in the minimum wage might increase
worker e˙ort or training or reduce costly turnover.39 Assume then that productivity is an
increasing and concave function of the wage; and/or that other labor costs are a decreasing
and convex function of the wage. We also assume perfect competition so that wages are
set at the eÿcient, output-maximizing level. The “labor supply” of the rich household is
captured by the number of workers employed. Since there are just two households, employers
are taxed and workers receive transfers.
Now, say we increases taxes on the rich by one dollar, and transfers to the poor by a
dollar. As is typical, this tax change produces only a “single” distortion: the rich will reduce
output and employ fewer workers. This makes both rich and poor households worse o˙, but
as long as the amount of distortion is smaller than a dollar, the poor are still better o˙ and
inequality is reduced.
Compare this to an increase in the minimum wage by one dollar. The e˙ect of wage hike
will be identical to the tax increase in the previous case, except for one crucial di˙erence.
39

There is an enormous literature debating the eÿciency of the minimum wage beginning, frst, with the
classic argument about employer monopsony power (Robinson, 1969). But more current research emphasizes de facto monopsony power arising from labor market frictions (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999;
Acemoglu, 2001; Manning, 2003). In such models, minimum wages can reduce costly turnover (Dube, Lester
and Reich, 2016) or increase productivity by increasing worker e˙ort (Akerlof, 1982) or training (Acemoglu
and Pischke, 1999).
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Because productivity is increasing in the wage (or other costs are falling or both), this second
“distortion” partially o˙sets the frst.40 This means that the fall in output and reduction in
employment will not be as large as in the tax case. As a result, the poor household is even
better o˙ than in the tax-only scenario and inequality still falls. Thus, the minimum wage
is more eÿcient than taxes in redistributing income.
This is hardly an isolated example. Nor must this particular example be true in order for
the general point to be valid. In fact, a variety of economic models in labor and employment
law, antitrust, fnancial markets, housing markets, and consumer protection all demonstrate
that legal rules can both increase eÿciency and reduce inequality (Dimick, 2016). Now,
because such rules increase eÿciency in these models, a standard response is that they do
not contradict the double-distortion argument. Since they are eÿcient, they are consistent
with the basic premise that legal rules should be chosen on this basis alone. But if there
are eÿcient redistributive legal rules, then a fortiori redistributive legal rules that are less
ineÿcient than redistributive taxation are just as plausible. For any of the above-cited
models, there almost certainly exist parameter values where the legal rule reduces eÿciency,
but by less than a distributionally-equivalent change in the tax schedule.
In fact, the double-distortion argument actually lowers the threshold required to justify
these kinds of market interventions. Typically, the threshold is whether the legal change is
eÿcient or not. In contrast, given the existence of costly redistributive taxation, the doubledistortion argument suggests that some ineÿciency is perfectly tolerable—as long as it is less
ineÿcient than the best tax alternative. The debate over the minimum wage is an example
of this. Much empirical work disagrees about whether the minimum wage induces any loss
in employment. But, given what we have just said, losses in employment are perfectly
acceptable as long as they are smaller than what would be induced by a distributionallyequivalent tax change.

5.3

Conclusion

A long-standing debate asks whether legal rules or only the income tax should be used to redistribute income. This article has traced this debate from its inception in law-and-economics
scholarship. Scholars found unconvincing the claims that eÿciency standards, such as Pareto
or Kaldor-Hicks eÿciency, could legitimately ignore the distributive consequences of legal
rules. Scholars also demonstrated that legal rules could in fact be redistributive in a variety
of scenarios, including in contractual or market relationships where it was alleged that sellers
could simply “pass on” the costs of legal rules to buyers.
However, proponents of the eÿciency- and tax-only view of legal-rule analysis developed
a powerful counterargument. This argument is that, even if legal rules could redistribute, the
income tax is more eÿcient in doing so. Consequently, law-and-economics scholars could still
ignore the distributive implications of legal rules. Perhaps the most convincing argument for
this position is the “double-distortion” argument developed by Kaplow and Shavell (1994).
This article has also reviewed the critiques of the double-distortion argument, which seem
to have had only limited impact on its reputation within the debate. However, along the
40

Indeed, although productivity increases it is indeed a distortion in a non-trivial sense because it is not
optimal—productivity is too high from an eÿciency point view and does not fully o˙set the wage increase.
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lines I have set out, I believe there are still unexplored grounds for challenging the doubledistortion argument, and for giving the greater standing to the distributive analysis of legal
rules in legal scholarship.
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